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(Information)
COUNCIL AND COMMISSION
NINETEENTH REPORT
ON mE ACTIVITIES OF mE MONETARY COMMITTEE
FOREWORD
The purpose  of  this report is to give a brief account of the activities of the Monetary Com-
mittee in the course of 1977.
During the year, the Committee held 11 sessions and the working parties drawn from its
own members or set up at its initiative met on many occasions. A list of members as at
31 December 1977 is annexed.
The report was adopted as at 31 December 1977.
INTRODUCTION
1. 1977 saw a slowdown in the expansion of world
economic activity. All the major industrialized countries
were affected, although to differing degrees, and inter-
national trade suffered as a result: from one year to
another their rate of growth by volume diminished by
almost half. Balance of payments disequilibria persisted
but unequally: the deficit of the non-oil-producing de-
veloping countries diminished, as did the OPEC sur-
plus; the deficit of the Community was also greatly
reduced. On the other hand, a new disequilibrium
namely a considerable worsening of the US deficit
made itself increasingly felt in the course of the year.
2. The economic situation in the Community presented
rather a contrast in 1977. The slowdown of expansion
was particularly marked, the rate of growth of output in
1977 scarcely exceeding half that of the preceding year.
Because of this, the employment situation did not im-
prove: unemployment at first continued to expand be-
fore stabilizing somewhat at the end of the year under
the effect of specific measures adopted in a majority of
countries. Un the other hand, considerable progress was
achieved on prices and external payments: a slowdown
in the rate of inflation was to be seen in the Community
as a whole, and was particularly marked in those coun-
tries where it had been highest; similarly, there was a
considerable reduction in the current deficit of the
Community, and it is mainly due to the improvement in
the current balances of countries who had the largest
deficits.
COMMUNITY ACTION AND THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMrrrEE
3. In 1977, as in previous years, the Committee de-
voted a major part of its time to examining the
economic situations of Member States, to studying ways
of reinforcing monetary and financial cooperationNo C 156/2 Official Journal of the European Communities
within the Community and finding a common position
on international monetary problems discussed primarily
in the International Monetary Fund.
4. During the year, all Community countries were
examined at least once and some of them much more
frequently, either in accordance with procedures
governing the use of Community credit mechanisms, or
as a result of developments in the economic situation of
those countries.
5. The countries whose economies were examined
most often therefore, in 1977, were Italy, the United
Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany. As
required by the Council Decision granting a Community
loan to Italy, the Committee was consulted by the
Commission on the economic situation in Italy and the
economic policy conditions to be observed by Italy in
1977. The opinion expressed by the Committee, based
on the work carried out by the  ad hoc  group chaired by
Mr de la Geniere, were taken into account when the
Council adopted a Directive on 17 May 1977 adapting
the conditions attached to the granting of medium-term
financial assistance to Italy in 1974 as well as two De-
cisions, one which authorized the Commission to bor-
row $ 500 million on the capital markets and lend this
sum to Italy and the other which fixed the economic
policy conditions to be observed by this country in re-
turp for the Community loans received in 1976 and
1977.
The Committee also closely followed the situation in the
United Kingdom, as the measures taken to meet the
sterling crisis of autumn 1976 began to take effect. At
the beginning of the year, the Committee received a
report ,from its  ad hoc  group chaired by Mr Andersen
on the "economic situation in the United Kingdom, and
in the light of this report, the Committee agreed that the
continued non-participation of the UK in the provision
of medium-term financial assistance to Italy was jus-
tified on the basis of the balance of payments and re-
serves situation. The Committee continued to monitor
developments in the British economy throughout the
year as the improvement particularly in the balance of
payments and on the financial front, was maintained.
The Committee also frequently discussed the monetary
situation in Germany and the way in which the German
authorities could contribute to' better equilibrium in
balances of payments within the Community.
6. In January the Committee also adopted the report
prepared by the Andersen group on the economic situ-
ation in Ireland and the respect ' of the economic policy
conditions in 1976, in accordance with the requirements
of the Decision granting a Community loan to Ireland.
In December, the group met again to consider de-
velopments in 1977 and to prepare a report which will
be submitted to the Committee early in 1978.
7. In the framework of the move to the 'own re-
sources' system for financing Community expenditure
in 1978, the Committee was consulted on the monetary
problems involved in the Commission s proposal for the
adoption of the European unit of account (EUA) in the
Community budget. It approved the proposals of the
Commission and recognized that the accounting method
envisaged had no monetary implications (Annex I).
8. In November 1976, the Committee had presented a
report to the Council and the Commission on a number
of monetary problems faced by the Community, among
which was the Community s exchange rate system. At
their meeting of 8 November 1976, the Council took
note of this report and requested both the Committee
and the Committee of Governors to see how and under
what circumstances the proposals to introduce a coher-
ent exchange rate policy system for the Community as a
whole could be implemented. (See paragraph 8 (a) of
the 18th report on the activities of the Monetary
Committee (l). After detailed discussions, the Com-
mittee approved the text of a declaration which it re-
quested the chairman to make to Council at its session
of 14 March (Annex II).
9. In this declaration, the Committee expressed its
reluctance to propose the introduction of a target zone
system to the Council at that time. On the other hand, it
suggested that the strengthening of economic and
financial cohesion of the Community could be done
without delay by initiating 'periodic consultations on
the direction and intensity of measures taken by the
Member States in so far as they affect the development
of exchange rates . As a result, the Committee has held
regular consultations on the development of exchange
rates, and on three occasions has devoted a major part
of its sessions to such consultations. These consultations
could playa useful role in contributing to a better un-
derstanding of the exchange rate policies of Member
States and therefore promoting a closer coordination of
these policies.
10. The second monetary problem which the Com-
mittee discussed in its report of November 1976, was
the use of quantitative monetary policy objectives. This
was also to be the subject of periodic discussion in the
Committee, and in addition to its regular surveys of
national monetary policies, the Committee has held one
detailed examination of the experience of Member
States in using such quantitative monetary policy objec-
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tives, of the different types of objectives used, and
Member States' assessment of the usefulness of such
objectives in achieving the goals of overall economic
policy.
11. Following the decision of the United Kingdom in
November 1976 not to renew the bilateral three-month
renewable credit it had extended to Italy at the time
when that country was granted MTF A, the Commission
requested the Council for permission to negotiate a $
500 million loan under the Communtiy loan mechanism
set up in February 1975. As required by the provisions
of the Regulation governing such loans, the Committee
was consulted on this proposal, and at later stages of
the procedure, which culminated in the issue of a $ 500
million Euro-bond issue in two tranches, one of $ 200
million for five years at 7.5 % and one of $ 300 million
seven years at 7.75 %. The Committee was again con-
sulted on proposals to change the floating rate portion
of the original loan operation to fixed rates. (One such
operation had already been done in October 1976 
see 18th report, paragraph 9). The consolidation was
completed by means of a $ 100 million fixed interest
bank credit provided by a group of Dutch banks in
April and a $ 100 million public offer of notes on the
New York market in July.
12. At the Council meeting of 18 July, the Belgian
President-in-office had put forward a series of proposals
for improving the Community s short- and medium-
term credit mechanisms and thereby providing for
convergence in the economies of Member States. The
Council had then requested the Monetary Committee
(along with the Committee of Governors) to examine
these proposals, which essentially involved an increase
in the quotas in the short-term monetary support system
and in the amounts of the ceilings in the medium-term
financial assistance, and increasing the conditionality of
both. Concentrating mainly on the question of the
MTF A, the Committee adopted a preliminary report.
which was submitted to the Council on 17 October
(Annex III). In response to a further request from the
Council, the Committee continued its examination and
presented a supplementary report to Council on 
November (Annex IV). This report proposed a doubling
of member countries' commitment ceilings in the
medium-term financial assistance mechanism provided
satisfactory adjustments were made to the rules of the
system on conditionality of loans, supervision of com-
pliance with policy conditions accompanying the grant-
ing of loans, conditions for possible exemption, and
mobilization of claims and the currency in which credits
made available are to be denominated. On the basis of
these two reports, the Commission prepared a draft
proposal and at its meeting of 19 December, the Coun-
cil adopted a Decision amending the MTF A mechanism
along the lines suggested ~y the Committee.
13. The Committee, along with the Economic Policy
Committee, was requested to examine the proposal
presented by the Commission to the European Council
on 29 and 30 June on 'investment and borrowing in the
Community . This communication proposed that the
Commission be permitted to raise loans up to 
amount of 1 000 million EUA. On the basis of a report
prepared by the alternates, the Committee adopted a
preliminary report to the Council and Commission at its
meeting of 12 October (Annex V). In the light of this
report, the Council then invited the Monetary Com-
mittee to pursue its examinations in order that it could
take a decision at its November meeting. At its meeting
of 15 November, the Committee adopted a supplemen-
tary report setting out a possible compromise solution
to the problems described in its first report (Annex VI).
This proposal was accepted by the Council and a formal
decision will be taken early in 1978.
14. As usual, the Committee also discussed inter-
national monetary questions on a number of occasions,
in preparation for the meetings of the Interim Commit-
tee in April, and the annual meetings of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund and World Bank in Washington
in October. This year, the main questions with which
the Committee was called upon to deal were interna-
tionalliquidity, in the framework of the seventh review
of quotas, the liquidity of the Fund itself, surveillance
by the Fund of exchange rate policies, and the role of
the SDR in the international monetary system.
15. The Committee also examined various other mat-
ters, including consultations under Article 108 of the
EEC Treaty, and proposals to change the conversion
rates for national currencies into units of account for
the purposes of the common agricultural policy.
WORKING PARTIES OF THE MONETARY COMMITTEE
16. The Working Party on Securities Markets met
three times in 1977, and continued to examine de-
velopments in the capital markets of the Member States
and in the international bond markets, and also discus-No C 156/4 Official Journal of the European Communities
sed capital market policies. It further pursued the work
begun in 1976 on the implications of the increasing use
of floating-rate loans, both on the international markets
and on national fixed-interest bond markets, as a means
of raising long-term capital.
17. The Working Party 'Harmonization of Monetary
Policy Instruments , a joint group of the Committee and
the Committee of Governors, met several times in 1977.
It continued its studies of simulation exercises with
monetary policy instruments, and analyses of the
transmission process of monetary policy, with a view to
presenting a new report to the Committee in 1978.Official Journal of the European Communities No C 156/5
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OPINION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE COMMISSION
ANNEX I
1. At its meeting of 30 March 1977 the Monetary Committee
examined the monetary problems involved in the adoption of
the European unit of account (EVA) in the Community budget
on the basis of documents presented by the Com-
mission departments and in the light of the proposal for a
Regulation of the Council adopting the EUA in the budget.
The Committee considered the other possible applications of
the unit of account which include:
(a) the European monetary cooperation fund;
(b) short-term mon~tary support system;
(c) medium-term financial assistance;
(d) Community loan.
The Committee noted that the Commission did not propose
the application of the EVA in respect of the European mone-
tary cooperation fund and the short-term monetary support
system, for which the EMVA is used. They noted also that the
Commission had deferred proposals to apply the EUA to
medium-term financial assistance and that it was not proposed
to apply the EVA in respect of Community loans.
2. Considering the problem of the application of the EVA to
the budget, the Committee agreed that there are no monetary
consequences of adopting the EVA for accounting purposes of
the Community and examined separately the problems arising
in connection with expenditure and those arising on the
revenue side.
3. The Committee felt it could accept the principle of deter-
mining budgetary expenditure in the EVA. It noted the Com-
mission s intention to implement this principle gradually and
to achieve it with the necessary flexibility.
It recognized, however, that by far the largest proportion of
Community expenditure is presently denominated in national
currencies, and in the agricultural unit of account (representa-
tive rates) and some of them were sceptical about the likeli-
hood of the proportion of EVA-determined expenditure reach-
ing a significant level in the near future. Some members expres-
sed particular concern about the application of the EVA to the
Community s contractual relationships. Moreover, concern
was expressed that the determination of payments to residents
in units of account might lead to exchange control difficulties.
It was noted in this connection that in the Commission s view
the determination of payments in units of account would in all
cases be subject to national exchange control regulations. The
Committee finally felt that the provisions for a price revision
index as laid down in Article 14 were unacceptable from a
monetary point of view.
4. Most members of the Committee were not ready to accept
the development of the EVA as a means of payment or a sig-
nificant expansion of accounts held with commercial banks
and denominated in EVA over and above those already in exis-
tence for ECSC use. Such an expansion in the view of some
members would have the consequence of giving rise to a paral-
lel currency, of provoking undesirable capital movements, and
would entail costs for banks in covering the foreign exchange
risks in several currencies.
5. The Committee also considered the principle proposed by
the Commission that the value of the budget receipts should be
maintained in EVA. The departments of the Commission jus-
tified this principle on the following grounds: although only a
small proportion of expenditure will at first be in EUA, the
currency of payment of the majority of expenditure is un-
known at the time of the budgetary decision. Therefore the
Committee considered that it is correct to maintain the value
of receipts over a spread of national currencies and that using
the EVA weighting is the most neutral and least contestable
solution from a Community point of view. Two methods of
ensuring this maintenance of value were examined:
(a) Own resources collected in national currencies would be
transformed into EUA on the date of payment. This can
either be done by the Commission holding EVA accounts
with the central banks, or by the Member States giving an
EVA guarantee. The national authority would then be free
to choose whether to guard against the exchange, risk by
purchasing the EVA 'basket' to the amount of its obligation
or to carry the exchange risk itself.
(b) Own resources are held in an account in national currency
in the Commission s name with the national monetary
authorities. The Commission would then administer these
funds and could in particular make transfers from one
currency to another.
6. The Committee felt that it might be possible and attractive
to look for ways of matching expenditure and revenue by cur-
rency: to the extent that expenditure and revenue could be
accurately forecast this would have the advantage of reducing
the amount of net transfers of funds to the minimum required
to accommodate net flows of financial resources between
Member States. However, the Commission departments
pointed out that the prediction of currency requirements both
in the short-run and in the long-run is uncertain, since Com-
munity policy may be changed in mid-year in the face of
special circumstances, (such as in 1976 when the basis of
payment of monetary compensatory amounts was changed),
and that under the own resources system, forecasting of re-
ceipts by currency is also very difficult. To the extent that a
large margin of error would exist, currency transfers might
well be substantial and frequent, thus raising difficulties for the
monetary authorities in their management of exchange mar-
kets.
7. To the extent that offsetting expenditure and revenue by
currency is not feasible, the Committee felt that an alternative
fairly well defined and administratively defensible criterion for
guiding the transfers between currencies would be for the
Commission to match its currency holdings to the EVA basket.
8. While applying the principle of keeping currency holdings
in step with the EVA weights there was still scope for cancel-
ling out, as far as possible, receipts and payments in the sameNo C 156/8 Official Journal of the European Communities
national currency so as to reduce to a minimum the need for
currency transfers. It was pointed out that the Commission
intended to continue its current practice of concentrating its
receipts and payments in time, thus minimizing the number of
transactions needed to maintain the value of receipts.
9. Although some of them found the first type of solution
paragraph 5 (a) as proposed by the Commission acceptable
the members of the Committee generally felt that the option in
paragraph 5 (b) appeared to be the system which is least com-
plex, most easily managed, offers most opportunity for cancel-
ling out payments and receipts and does not require the open-
ing of EUA-denominated bank accounts. However, it was
recognized that in operating such an arrangement the Com-
mission would still have to make some transfers. These trans-
fers should be subject to concertation with the monetary ' au-
thorities so as to minimize their impact on exchange markets
and reserves management.
10. It was felt that this system offered significant scope for
experimentation: the Committee, like the Commission, recog-
nized the need for a broad guideline, but it considered that a
flexible and pragmatic approach should be adopted at least in
the initial stages so as to allow for eventual reconsideration
and adjustment.
ANNEX II
ORAL STATEMENT TO COUNCIL ON THE COMMUNITY EXCHANGE RATE SYSTEM
At the request of the Council (416th session of 8 November
1976), the Monetary Committee has again examined how and
under what circumstances the Dutch proposals on the
strengthening of economic and financial cohesion of the
Community could be made operational. The Committee has
asked its chairman to make an oral report to the Council on
this subject.
The members of the Monetary Committee, in their discussions
supported the objectives of the Dutch proposals. They unani-
mously agreed that the main point of this initiative is to initiate
more consultations in order not only to reduce the danger of
divergent developments in exchange rates between members of
the European exchange arrangement and other members of the
Community, but also to foster convergence in economic pol-
icy and exchange rates. As was emphasized on several oc-
casions in the Committee, these consultations should cover all
areas of economic and financial policy which are relevant to
the development of exchange rates. There are, even nQw, suf-
ficient grounds for this procedure, certainly at a time when the
economic policies of the Member States and their exchange
rates obviously do not show a sufficient degree of convergence.
I migth add that existing Council Decision already require such
consultations, and this irrespective of whether and when
target zones' can be established.
A~ indicated in its report to the Council and the Commission
of 4 November 1976, the Committee considers that, for the
foreseeable future, it would not be feasible to introduce a co-
herent exchange rate policy system, if such a system were to go
beyond consultations and also contain binding obligations
whether in respect of general economic policy or exchange rate
policy in particular. Such obligations can only be undertaken
when appreciable progress has been made towards the con-
vergence of economic policies and when there is a sufficiently
parallel development on the exchange markets.
It is mainly on these grounds that the Committee is reluctant to
propose the introduction of a target zone system to the Council
at the present moment. There is also the fact that a number of
differences of opinion still remain in the Committee on indi-
vidual aspects of the target zone concept (method of calcu-
lation and usefulness of effective rates, uncertainty as to the
reaction of the exchange markets to the establishment of target
zones). Discussion of these questions should continue in the
Monetary Committee.
I believe I am interpreting correctly the views of all the mem-
bers of the Committee when I say that it is more a question of
practical action and pragmatic procedure than formal de-
cisions. Therefore I suggest that:
the Monetary Committee initiate, without delay, periodic
consultations on the direction and intensity of measures
taken by the Member States in so far as they affect the
development of exchange rates
the Commission be requested to make available all the
necessary data to the Monetary Committee for this pur-
pose,
the Monetary Committee report to the Council and the
Commission on the outcome of its consultations
Member States decide in the Council to what extent the
recommendations of the Monetary Committee can be put
into effect.
I am convinced that such consultations in the Monetary
Committee would be an initial realistic step towards taking
account of the proposals of the Dutch and French Ministers of
Finance as well as one of the aspects of the Tindemans Report.Official Journal of the European Communities No C 156/9
ANNEX III
REPORT TO THE COUNCIL AND THE COMMISSION ON THE BELGIAN PROPOSALS
1. At the Council meeting of 18 July 1977, the Belgian Presi-
dency submitted a programme for action in the field of
economic and finance. In particular, this programme makes
suggestions for amending and improving the short- and
medium-term credit mechanisms which exist at present within
the Community. The Council asked the Monetary Committee
to examine these suggestions and report back in time for the
October Council meeting. In response to this request, the
Monetary Committee is submitting the present report which
embodies the conclusions of its preliminary discussions on this
matter.
2. The work of the Monetary Committee at its meetings of 9
September and 12 October was based on a memorandum from
the Belgian members which spells out 'in detail their ideas
concerning the Community credit mechanisms. The Belgian
memorandum suggests that the credit mechanisms be amended
as follows:
(a)  Short-term monetary support
existing debtor quotas for each central bank would be
doubled by adding a second debtor tranche of an equal
amount
creditor quotas would be increased by 50 %,
the  rallonge  would be doubled
barring exceptional circumstances, no country could re-
ceive more than half the  rallonge
any drawing involving utilization of the second tranche
and any or all of the  rallonge  would be open only to those
countries who have agreed to announce the adoption of
intermediary monetary objectives.
(b)  Medium-term financial assistance
the credit ceilings would be doubled
access to the facility would be subject to stricter conditions
in particular in the field of public finance
where appropriate the medium-term financial assistance
could be disbursed in instalments, the drawing of each
instalment being subject to the observation of specific
conditions.
3. The Committee shares and approves the motivations which
have guided the Belgian members in making their proposals.
Indeed there was agreement in the Committee that ways of
enlarging and improving the existing credit mechanisms and at
the same time of making conditionality more effective should
be considered in conjunction. In addition, the Committee feels
that present credit arrangements should be reviewed so as to
provide accommodation for more than one member country
and to avoid them being used up almost entirely by a single
beneficiary.
4. On the problem of increasing the amounts available within
the two Community credit arrangements, the Committee has
not been able to reach a unanimous position. It is generally
recognized that given the development of balance of payments
and reserve positions there is no urgent demand for financial
assistance within the Community at present. Most members
argue that periods of relative calm should be put to good use
and consider that the Belgian suggestions to increase the
amounts within the two credit mechanisms should be
examined now so that they are available in the future when
new difficulties might arise. Some members consider that the
lack of urgency at present and in the foreseeable future argues
in favour of postponement. They also see no need to increase
the amounts of the short-term mechanism in advance of the
quinquennial review referred to in Article 2 of the Agreement
of central banks of 9 February 1970.
5. The resources available in the short-term monetary support
system were already substantially increased in March 1974.
Even so, the credit facilities currently available to individual
countries under the short-term system are not notably higher
than those available under the medium-term financial assist-
ance. Members agreed that it would be difficult under the
short-term monetary support to impose conditions which
could not be fulfilled or properly monitored in the short-term.
While taking note that the Beligan proposals are not to be in-
terpreted in this sense, the Committee felt that these proposals
should be worked out in greater detail.
In any case, the Committee noted that the Belgian proposals
concerning the short-term monetary support mechanism were
being examined by the Committee of Governors of Central Bank~ 
6. A clear majority of the Committee recognized that an in-
crease in the resources available in the medium-term financial
assistance mechanism is warranted on several grounds: these
resources have remained unchanged ever since the mechanism
was created in March 1971; almost all funds available are
presently used up by one single borrower; and there is, finally,
a good case to match the medium-term resources to those
available in the short-term, as in actual practice it is to 
expected that the latter would often precede the former. This
last argument is further reinforced by the fact that the majority
of the Committee thinks that the resources in the short-term
monetary support should themselves be increased. Some differ-
ences of opinion emerged in the Committee concerning the
extent of the increase that would be justified in present circum-
stances and the timing of it in the light of the parallel dis-
cussion on IMF quota increases.
All members supported the idea that an increase in resources
should be combined with more effective conditionality. Dis-
bursements of the medium-term facility in instalments over a
period of time could be an appropriate way of achieving that
result. Doubts were however expressed on the possibility of
implementing disbursements by instalments whenever substan-
tial recourse to the short-term monetary support precedes the
granting of medium-term financial assistance.
In any event, it was felt that before any decision were taken on
modifying and enlarging the medium-term mechanism, careful
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ing-out clauses and mobilization of claims (Articles 4 (1) and 5
(3) respectively of Council Decision 71/143/EEC of 22 March
1971). Some members further consider that before a decision is
taken, attention should be devoted to the possibility of a paral-
lel expansion of the Community loan mechanism.
They also suggested that the adoption of the EVA for Com-
munity credit mechanisms should be examined. 
7. The Committee emphasizes that the conclusions of the
present report are preliminary and that it has not been possible
to agree on all points. It is hardly possible for the Committee
to pursue the matter further without the Council's endorse-
ment of the view that the convergence of the economic policies
of member countries at this juncture could (and hence should)
be promoted through an enlargement of the Community credit
arrangements combined with strengthened procedures for
effectively securing the fulfilment of conditions attached to
borrowing under these arrangements.
However, if Ministers could reach agreement in principle on
the above point of view, the Committee could analyze more
closely the technical problems and implications; it points out in
this connection that it is for the Committee of Governors of
Central Banks to take and implement the decisions rega1;'ding
the short-term support mechanism. 
ANNEX IV
SECOND REPORT TO THE COUNCIL AND THE COMMISSION ON THE BELGIAN
PROPOSALS
1. At the Council meeting on 18 July 1977, the Belgian Presi-
dent put forward an action programme on economic and
financial matters featuring, among other things, proposals for
adjusting and improving the Community s existing short and
medium-term credit mechanisms. The Council instructed the
Monetary Commitee to examine these proposals. The Commit-
tee drew up a preliminary report that it submitted to the
Council on 17 October. The Council expressed the view that
convergence of Member States' economic policies must go
hand in hand with moves to adjust the credit mechanisms
together with moves to strengthen the procedures aimed at
ensuring effective compliance with the economic policy condi-
tions attaching to these mechanisms. It called on the Monetary
Committee to present its definitive report in sufficient time for
it to take a decision on the matter at its meeting to be held on
21 November.
Medium-tenn financial assistance
2. The Committee takes the view that the medium-tenD.
financial assistance arrangements should be improved, starting
from the proposals put forward by the Belgian delegation.
Doubling member countries' commitment  ceilings is feasible
provided satisfactory adjustments are made to the medium-
term financiaf assistance rules on conditionality, supervision of
compliance with policy conditions accepted, conditions for
exemption and mobilization of claims, and the currency in
which credits made available are to be denominated.
3. In any event, it is essential that drawing by a single
Member State on the medium-term financial assistance should
not exhaust the resouces of the system. It is therefore assumed
that no Member State could in principle draw more than 50 %
of the total of credit ceilings, having due regard to the size of
the borrowing country. 
4. Where a Member State applies for all medium-term
financial assistance, the economic policy conditions to be en-
tered into by the beneficiary must aim at restoring internal and
external economic equilibria. To ensure compliance with these
conditions, resources made available under the medium-term
financial assistance arrangements would, so far as possible, be
paid in successive instalments, the release of each instalment
being conditional on a review of economic performance based
on targets fixed in advance.
5. The Committee is of the view that the present procedure
under which any Member State can be exempted from par-
ticipating in an medium-term financial assistance operation by
a simple declaration that it is experiencing balance of payments
difficulties, should be amended. It is proposed that where one
or more countries represent that they would have difficul ty in
financing the whole, or any part of their contribution, they
shall be exempted to the extent necessary only if the Council
acting on a recommendation from the Commission and on an
opinion delivered by the Monetary Committee, has taken a
decision by a qualified majority that the exemptions in ques-
tion are justified and on how, in consequence the sl).ortfall in
contributions shall be financed.
6. Member ~tates that experience balance of payments dif-
ficulties after contributing to the financing of a medium-term
financial assistance operation and request mobilization of their
claim are to be treated on a similar footing as countries
granted an exemption. With this in mind, the Committee is of
the opinion that all the necessary steps should be taken to
ensure the effective implementation of the mobilization pro-
cedure. In this connection, several members suggested that an
agreement signed with the BIS would serve as an effective
guarantee of mobilization, and that the possibility of using the
Community loan mec~anism should be considered.
7. The present procedure is that exempted countries are sub-
ject to monitoring , by the Monetary Committee. A similarOfficial Journal of the European Communities No C 156/11
provision should also apply to any country granted mobiliz-
ation of its claim. This examination should cover not only the
situation with regard to its balance of payments and reserves
but also to the general ,economic situation.
8. Claims and obligations arising in connection with appli-
cation of the medium-term financial assistance arrangements
would be denominated in European units of account, in
accordance with methods which will need to be examined.
9. The majority of the Comittee supports the principle that
the Community loan mechanism should be adjusted as soon as
possible along the same lines as the medium-term financial
assistance arrangements. Some members think, however, that
the Community loan mechanism must not be renewable since
it was approved as an exceptional support measure designed to
remedy balance of payments difficulties stemming from the
higher oil prices. The members in question have also pointed
out that, unlike the medium-term financial assistance arrange-
ments, the Community loan machinery is not based on the
Article providing for mutual assistance in the event of balance
of payments difficulties (Article 108 of the Treaty of Rome).
Short-tenD monetary support
10. Noting that adjustment of the short-term monetary
support arrangements will be dealt with by the Committee of
Governors ina separate report to the Council, the Monetary
Committees has only examined in detail the question of condi-
tionality. In its view, the special consultation procedure pro-
vided for in Article 4 of the Council Decision of 16 February
1970 in connection with the granting of support but not incor-
porated in the Council Decision of 18 February 1974, should
be reintroduced. Such consultation could cover the economic
situation of the beneficiary country, its economic policy stance
and also the latter s compatibility with the guidelines laid
down by the Council. At the same time, the different consulta-
tion and coordination procedures provided for within the
Community would need to be observed and more effectively
applied.
REPORT TO THE COUNCIL AND THE COMMISSION ON THE COMMISSION PROPOSALS
ANNEX V
1. As instructed by the Council, the Monetary Committee
considered, at its meetings of 21 September, 7 and 12 October
the proposals presented by the Commission, in its communi-
cation of 15 June 1977 to the European Council, concerning
the creation of a new Community borrowing instrument
(Com(77) 300 fin.
, '
Investment and borrowing in the Com-
munity
2. The Committee considers that the Commission s ideas need
to be elaborated in much greater detail and their implications
spelt out before the proposal can be fully evaluated. In particu-
lar, it believes that the Commission should explain more pre-
cisely how their proposals would relate to existing financing
mechanisms in the Community, including the European In-
vestment Bank and Regional Development Fund; and how they
would attain the desired objective.
---;:- 
General considerations
3. The Commission representatives explained that the concep-
tual background of their proposal was on the one hand, the
very low level of activity and employment in the Community,
and on the other hand, the slowdown in the rate of fixed in-
vestment. The envisaged action has therefore a double objec-
tive: short-term and structural. Indeed it aims at sustaining the
level of economic activity and employment, and at the same
time at improving Community economic structures by en-
couraging investment in the priority fields of energy, regional
infrastructure and redevelopment. It must be emphasized that
the projected action could remain within modest limits  the
ceiling for outstanding loans could, in a first phase, be limited
to one billion EUA  since the proposal aimed at producing a
sort of psychological triggering effect on public opinion to
facilitate the development of a general climate of recovery in
activity and particularly in investment.
4. According to the Commission, although the action was
designed to adjust the current trend, the projected instrument
was intended to apply to essentially structural operations; it is
in this area that the low level of activity in the Community
seems to present dangers for the future and must be tackled.
With this in mind, the Commission foresees the possibility of
carrying out successive operations within a lending ceiling so
that amounts reimbursed by borrowers could, if necessary, be
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should be rapidly undertaken to satisfy its cyclical objective
and continue over time to satisfy its structural objective. At
all events, the fixing of priority sectors which would be done
by Council on a proposal from the Commission should be
done flexibly to match changing circumstances.
5. The Commission feels that the Community s present
financial intruments are not adapted to such a scheme. Two of
them (ECSC and Euratom) have a very specific purpose. With
regard to the EIB, the trend of its operations presupposes an
increase in its capital which would take time and, until now
the majority of its operations have been devoted to regional
development.
6. The Commission considered that the creation of an ad-
ditional borrowing instrument for it to administer would allow
extra funds to be collected without any deterioration in the
excellent standing of the Community 'name . The Com-
mission s experience on capital markets led it to believe, at a
conservative estimate, that it could step up total funds raised
by all Community agencies by up to 1500 million to 2000
million EUA per year. On this basis, it thought that its pro-
posal for a limit of 1 000 million EVA was modest, and could
be achieved without difficulty.
7. To see if there is really a need which the Commission
proposals will satisfy, the Committee considered it necessary to
look at the means for financing investment which currently
exist in Member States, both internally and externally. It ap-
peared that, in most countries, and despite differences in their
financial structures, existing private and public mechanisms
were largely able to satisfy the demand for investment funds.
In this respect, several members stressed the basic role in the
adjustment process played by the free operation of the capital
markets in the economy of their country. Other members
moreover, emphasized the existence in their countries of public
intervention and correction mechanisms designed specifically
to ensure the matching of needs and financing possibilities
while respecting fundamental economic equilibria. However, it
seems that for the ltlajority of Member States the functioning
of these internal mechanisms in no way excludes recourse to
external financing, even for very substantial amounts. But re-
course to such financing was for the most part motivated by
tht:. need to cover the balance of payments of the borrowing
countries. In several countries, though use of external invest-
ment financing may be not only for such balance of payments
needs but may mainly arise out of a desire to match aU sources
of credit to needs generated within the economy, particularly
in certain sectors: in these countries external financing is seen
as the best method of satisfying some essential investment
needs.
8. Some members emphasized that the present low level of
investment can, in most cases, not be attributed to a shortage
of financial resources. They held the view that at least in their
countries, investment was hindered not only by a lack of prof-
itability but also by political, sociological or ecological
constraints. They doubted therefore whether an additional
financial mechanism which in no way contributed to a solution
of these difficulties could be justified or efficacious.
9. To assess whether a new Community mechanism for
financing investments was needed, the Committee briefly
examined Member States' judgements on the functioning of
the present Community financing instruments. They thought
that existing Community credit mechnisms had usually been
adequate for their purpose  that of supplying 'top-up
financing in the relevant sectors and institutional domains. The
majority felt that these mechanisms were adequate at the
moment for current needs. If an increase in Community financ-
ing was necessary however, these members would prefer exist-
ing machinery to ~e developed possibly by improving their
procedures rather than the creation of new instruments. They
thought that the EIB in particular could take responsibility for
satisfying the needs that had led the Commission to draw 
its proposals. A step in this direction had already been made
with the EIB Governors' decision in principle to increase the
bank' s capital next year, thus enabling the bank to increase the
volume of its operations. They felt that the banks' operations
in particular as defined in Article 130 of the Treaty of Rome
could fully cover the projects which the Commission intends to
finance with the new instrument. These same members also
remarked that in the field of energy, the Community had re-
cently set up a new credit mechanism under Euratom, where at
least some assessment of experience was necessary to see if this
action would suffice for the energy sector, as was recently be-
lieved.
Some members believed that the objectives pursued by the
Commission could also be attained by increased use of other
instruments in the Community budget, such as the Regional
Development Fund, but the implications of this proposal could
not be looked at in the time available.
10. Some members thought that although existing mechanisms
were useful and effective, they were unduly restricted as to
sector of intervention or as to the criteria for selecting projects:
according to them, the EIB could not consider projects with
deferred or low profitability. In addition, it operated case by
case, using banking criteria, without any overall action pro-
gramme coordinated with national development plans.
Finally, it does not sufficiently consider social projects and
favours the productive sector. For these members, conse-
quently, a new mechanism would only be attractive if it al-
lowed these constraints to be overcome by assuring the financ-
ing of projects of a social nature, of weak, uncertain or defer-
red profitability or highly labour intensive. In addition, some
members emphasized two limitations of the EIB financing: the
creation of an exchange risk for the borrower and the require-
ment of a market interest rate. Any new mechanism should not
involve these two aspects. It would be necessary in particular
to link it with an interest subsidy mechanism within the
Community budget: in principle, such interest subsidies can
already be granted by the Regional Development Fund for EIB
loans. The majority of members considered that the problem of
interest subsidy is of a different nature, and does not concern
the present proposals.Official Journal of the European Communities No C 156/13
11. The Committee emphasized that, in any case, the purpose
of the proposed mechanism was not to finance balance of
payments needs. Several members expressed the view that 
agreed common regional, sectoral and structural policy which
would help to promote integration in the Community, would
provide a particularly appropriate framework in which to
create any new mechanism.
12. Without prejudice to the final answer to the essential
point of the need for the new machinery, and in the light of the
reservations set out above, the Committee went on to consider
the main technical aspects of the proposed mechanism. It did
not try to reach a consensus on these various aspects, but
merely drew up a preliminary inventory of the reactions and
suggestions put forward. It emphasizes that this is only an in-
itial outline summary which could not fully reply to the request
from the Council and merely aimed at providing an interim
report for Council on 17 October. 
Technical observations
13.  Amount
The amount of 1 000 million EUA, suggested by the Com-
mission, had no specific technical foundations; it was based
both on the Commission s estimate of the amounts likely to be
available on the capital markets and the approximate sum
necessary to achieve the psychological 'trigger' effect on in-
vestments hoped for. Several members thought that the volume
of real needs should be examined: some of them doubted that
profitable projects requiring such sums were immediately
available. Many members felt that the size of the mechanisms
also depended on the reactions of the market.
14.  Duration
The Commission s proposal for a mechanism with no time
limit was justified by the fact that the stimulation of invest-
ment was a long-term task. Many members felt that this aspect
was incompatible with a counter-cyclical action, and believed
that an operation with a time limit and excluding the auto-
matic re-establishment of the ceiling would be more justified.
They emphasized that a proposal aiming primarily at structural
objectives of unlimited duration would make existing problems
more difficult and would give rise to new ones which would
require further serious examination.
15.  Examination
management
of projects, and financing decisions
There were two possible procedures. Under the first procedure
which appears to be that favoured by the Commission, the
Commission would recommend that the Council should take
the basic decision and adopt general guidelines on a proposal
from the Commission who would then be responsible for
execution. The Commission would therfore decide on the
eligibility of projects, i.e. their compatibility with the Com-
munity s overall policies, whilst they would be examined from
a technical point of view by the Em. Under the second, basic
decisions would also be taken by the Council on a Commission
proposal; but decisions on the projects and examination would
be the responsibility of the Em. The majority of members
thought the second procedure had the advantage of drawing
on the technical expertise and experience of the Em without
introducing an institutional change lying outside the Com-
mittee s purview. It goes without saying that, as for the Em, no
project would be financed, in whole or in part, which would be
opposed by the Member State in whose territory it is to be
carried out.
16. Some members suggested that a straightforward expan-
sion of the Em's operations would achieve the same end as the
proposed action but without altering any present procedures
so that action would be quicker and more efficient. Others felt
that this solution would. endanger the emphasis put on the
originality and specificity of the operation, while that proposed
by the Commission would allow a better coordination of pro-
jects under the aegis of the Commission.
17.  Guarantee
The Commission did not consider that there was any need for
a specific guarantee by the member countries to the Com-
munity, like that granted in connection with the Community
loan. It thought there would be no difficulty in borrowing on
the security of the Community budget alone. There were con-
siderable advantages in this solution, from the point of view of
simplicity and avoiding the need to involve the credit rating of
Member States. Some members doubted however, whether
without specific guarantees by the Member States, the Com-
mission would indeed be able to borrow an additional 1 000
million EUA on the market.
The Committee drl not pursue the question of accounting for
the operations arising from this mechanism at this stage.
18.  Lending conditions
The Commission hoped as far as possible to carry out ' blank
transactions , with absolute equality between the terms for
Community borrowings and the terms of the loans granted.
These lending conditions would be a function of the borrowing
terms, so that arrangements for obtaining and using funds
would be identical, and the Community budget would not be
affected. However, according to some members if the principle
of 'blank transactions' were always maintained , this could lead
to lost opportunities when circumstances were favourable to
borrowing, and thus hinder the smooth running of the pro-
posed mechanism. These members emphasize the danger to the
Community name of too many small borrowing operations.No C 156/14
19. Market reactions
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The entry on the market of a new name might be seen as a way
of increasing total borrowable resources, were it only because
of investors' desire to diversify. But it might also carry a risk of
the Community s signature being devalued, and lead to stiffer
terms not only for Community agencies but also for Member
States seeking funds on the international market. At all events
issue time tables would have to be coordinated by Community
issuers among themselves. Some members also sought coordi-
nation between Community issuers and issuers from member
countries, to avoid causing problems for the latter. To solve
this problem it was suggested that the Monetary Committee
would be the most suitable body to playa coordinating role.
Other members, while emphasizing the risks of competition
felt that the idea of such coordination would not be practicable
under present circumstances.
20. Community loans would usually be placed on markets
outside the Community but there might be a case in certain
circumstances for using the national. markets of Member States
with the agreement of the authorities of the countries con-
cerned. The numerous problems of exchange rate risk, which
involve both the Community and beneficiaries of loans, must
be studied in further detail.
21.  On-lending
It seemed that the on-lending of funds obtained by the new
financial instrument could not really follow any predetermined
criterion; any idea of quotas by country, or other systems of
geographical distribution, was to be ruled out. The Council
would decide on the sectors to be granted loans, periodically,
and in the light of circumstances and needs in the Community.
22. For many members, the preceding considerations show
that a number' of aspects of the proposed mechanism must be
considered in banking terms and suggest that a banking-type
solution might be the best one, both for raising funds on the
market, and for on-lending. In this light, they think that the
EIB should be responsible for implementing the proposed
operation. At any rate, a special 'window' for this purpose
could be set up within the EIB.
ANNEX VI
SECOND REPORT TO THE COUNCIL AND THE COMMISSION ON THE COMMISSION
PROPOSALS
1. The Commission recently presented a communication to
the Council on investment and borrowing in the Community.
As requested by the Council, the Monetary Committee pre-
pared a report which was presented to the Council at its meet-
ing on 17 October 1977. The Council invited the Monetary
Committee to pursue its examination so as to enable it to reach
a decision on the matter at its meeting on 21 November 1977.
2. The Committee is of the opinion that the general consider-
ations and the outline of the divergences in present positions
set out in Section A of its report of 12 October cannot usefully
be taken much further. Furthermore, the various technical
aspects of the Commission proposal were examined in Section
B of the report and there have been no new elements since then
to shed light on the uncertainties which persist.
3. Consequently, the Committee considers that a basic politi-
cal question must be settled by the Council: supposing that
there is agreement on boosting investment through Community
action, is it necessary and desirable to have recourse to a new
instrument instead of making use of the EIB, whose capital, the
Board of Governors has decided, is to be increased substan-
tially in 1978? Assuming the Council' s answer to this question
is in the affirmative, the Committee has discussed the general
lines of a possible compromise which, while departing from the
Commission proposal, lies mid-way between the positions
adopted by the Member States on the proposal.
4. This compro~ise solution could be based on the following
arrangements:
(a) the Commission would borrow up to a maximum of EVA
1 000 million, preferably on external financial markets;
(b) borrowing operations would be carried out in such a way
as to satisfy the following objectives:
the dates and amounts of issues would be fixed so as to
obtain the best terms on the market
other issues by the Community and member countries
would not be disrupted
issues would be made only for projects which had been
sufficiently examined;
(c) a guarantee would be provided by the Community
budget (1);
(d) the funds would be handed over to the EIB and, if neces-
sary, temporarily invested;
(I) Some members doubt whether a budget guarantee would, in all circumstances
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(e) the EIB would examine loan requests in sectors and for
types of operation decided on by the Council on a pro-
posal from the Commission (e.g. energy, infrastructure and
redevelopment). The EIB would apply its usual criteria 
these operations (1);
(f) projects would be 'Submitted in accordance with the proce-
dures laid down in the Statutes of the EIB and loans would
be approved by the Board of Directors of the EIB, follow-
ing an opinion from the Commission (2) (3). Particular
attention would have to be given to projects which would
help to reduce unemployment;
(g) the exchange risk would be borne entirely by the borrower.
There would be no interest rate subsidy (4
(h) loan terms would be fixed at cost price, on the basis of the
borrowing terms obtained by the Commission, while ensur-
ing that all the costs incurred are covered. The terms would
not necessarily be the same for all the projects approved;
(i) the funds paid back to the EIB (capital and interest) would
allow the Commission to repay the money it borrowed.
5. While accepting the compromise solution set out above
some members consider that the setting up of a new Com-
munity loan instrument could be even more useful if it formed
part of a wider context based on regional, sectoral and struc-
tural policies drawn up at Community level to promote the
integration of the economies of the Member States.
) Some members feel that new criteria suited to the structural and economic situa-
tion in the Community should be adopted by the Council for these operations.
(2) Some members feel that Council approval of projects should be unanimous.
Other members feel that it is the Commission which should approve the pro-
jects.
) Some members are of the opinion that the funds made available under loans
,hould be paid to governments actin!; as intermediaries.
) Some members cannot exclude  a priori  the principle of an interest rate subsidy
or an exchange guarantee.